Johnson v. American Standard

Sophisticated User Defense, Applicable to Negligence and Strict Products Liability Causes of Actions, Exempts Manufacturers From Duty To Provide Sophisticated Users With Warnings About Product Hazards

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In Johnson v. American Standard (2008) __ C.4th __, 74 C.R.3d 108, 179 P.3d 905, 2008 WL 878933, plaintiff, a trained and certified heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) technician, brought a products liability action against defendant, an air conditioning equipment manufacturer, for negligence and strict liability. Plaintiff alleged that his work on equipment manufactured by defendant involved a refrigerant, R-22, that, when exposed to the heat generated by welding, decomposed into phosgene gas, causing him to develop pulmonary fibrosis. Plaintiff's theory was that defendant, knowing that servicing its equipment would create a known harmful gas, failed to provide plaintiff with an adequate warning. Defendant successfully moved for summary judgment, claiming that it had no duty to warn about the risks of R-22 exposure because it could assume that the group of trained professionals to which plaintiff belonged was aware of those risks. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the sophisticated user defense, which had been adopted by the federal courts, applied in California and that plaintiff was a sophisticated user. Held, affirmed.

(a) Nature and development of sophisticated user defense.

(1) Generally speaking, manufacturers have a duty to warn consumers about the hazards inherent in their products. (2008 WL 878933, p. 3, citing Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1991) 53 C.3d 987, 281 C.R.2d 528, 810 P.2d 549, 6 Summary (10th), Torts, §1477.) However, where a sophisticated user is involved, the sophisticated user defense exempts manufacturers from their typical obligation to provide product users with warnings about potential hazards and acts as an affirmative defense that negates the manufacturer’s duty to warn. The rationale supporting the defense is that the failure to provide warnings about risks already known to a sophisticated user usually is not a proximate cause of harm resulting from those risks, because the user's knowledge of the dangers is equivalent to prior notice. (2008 WL 878933, p. 3.)

(2) Rest. 2d, Torts §388 provides that a supplier of goods is liable for physical harm that the goods cause if (a) the supplier knows or should know that the items are likely to be dangerous, (b) it fails to reasonably warn of the danger, and (c) it “has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition.” Courts have interpreted the quoted language to mean that, if the manufacturer reasonably believes that the user knows or should know about a product's risk, the manufacturer need not warn that user of that risk. Federal decisions that have adopted the sophisticated user defense have cited Rest. 2d, Torts §388, as a basis for doing so. While California has not expressly adopted the sophisticated user defense, it adopted Rest. 2d, Torts §388, in Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1973) 9 C.3d 51, 107 C.R.45, 507 P.2d 653, 6 Summary (10th), Torts, §1177. (2008 WL 878933, p. 4.)

(3) Bojorquez v. House of Toys (1976) 62 C.A.3d 930, 133 C.R.483, recognizes the obvious danger rule, which provides that there is no need to warn of known risks under either a negligence or strict liability theory. Although no California court has squarely adopted the sophisticated user defense, that defense is a natural outgrowth of the obvious danger rule, because the sophisticated user defense recognizes that, for those who know or should know about a product's potential dangers, i.e., sophisticated users, the dangers are obvious. “Just as a manufacturer need not warn ordinary consumers about generally known dangers, a manufacturer need not warn members of a trade or profession . . . about dangers generally known to that trade or profession.” (2008 WL 878933, p. 5.)

(4) In Fierro v. International Harvester Co. (1982) 127 C.A.3d 862, 179 C.R. 923, the court, in dictum, addressed the sophisticated user defense in the strict liability context. The Court of Appeal, after affirming the trial court's judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had not properly raised at trial the issue of failure to warn, impliedly adopted the sophisticated user defense in rationalizing its affirmance of that judgment. Numerous federal courts have taken notice of Fierro and have predicted that the sophisticated user defense would eventually be adopted in California. (2008 WL 878933, p. 6, 7, 8, disapproving the reasoning in Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co. of America (1990) 221 C.A.3d 1601, 271 C.R. 596, 13 Summary (10th), Equity, §155, to the extent that it might lead to the conclusion that the sophisticated user defense should not be adopted.)

(b) Public policy. Requiring manufacturers to warn their users in all instances would place an onerous burden on them and would invite mass consumer disregard and ultimate contempt for the warning process. The sophisticated user defense fits into this understanding of the role of warnings. It helps ensure that warnings will be heeded. In addition, although manufacturers are responsible for products that contain dangers of which the public is unaware, they are not insurers, even under strict liability, for the mistakes or carelessness of consumers who should know of the dangers involved. “Accordingly, we adopt the defense in California.” (2008 WL 878933, p. 8.)

(1) A manufacturer is not liable to a sophisticated user of its product for failure to warn of a danger if the sophisticated user knew or should have known of the danger. "[I]ndividuals who represent that they have training or are members of a sophisticated group of users are saying to the world that they possess the level of knowledge and skill associated with that class," and, if they do not actually possess that knowledge and skill, that fact should not give rise to liability on the part of the manufacturer. "Under the 'should have known' standard there will be some users who are actually unaware of the dangers. However, the same could be said of the currently accepted obvious danger rule," where the courts employ an objective test and do not inquire into the user's subjective knowledge. Thus, under the sophisticated user defense, even if a user is truly unaware of a product's hazards, that fact is irrelevant if the danger is objectively obvious. (2008 WL 878933, p. 8.)

(2) Noting that some federal decisions recognize the sophisticated user defense in negligence actions, but reject it in strict products liability actions, plaintiff contended that the “should have known” requirement of the sophisticated user defense conflicts with principles of strict liability and that the defense should thus be limited to cases where the plaintiff has actual knowledge. This contention is without merit. In the context of the sophisticated user defense, because intended users are deemed to know of the risks, manufacturers have no obligation to warn. The focus of the defense, therefore, is whether the danger in question is so generally known within the trade or profession that a manufacturer should not have been expected to provide a warning specific to the group to which plaintiff belonged. Consequently, there is no reason why the sophisticated user defense should not be as available against strict liability causes of action as it is for negligence causes of action. In both instances, the sophisticated user's knowledge eliminates the manufacturer's need for a warning. "In addition, even if the 'should have known' standard is more closely aligned with a negligence concept, we have repeatedly held that strict liability products law in California may incorporate negligence concepts without undermining the principles fundamental to a strict liability claim." The sophisticated user defense is thus applicable to both negligence and strict liability causes of action. (2008 WL 878933, p. 9.)

(3) The sophisticated user's knowledge of the risk is measured from the time of the plaintiff's injury, rather than from the date the product was manufactured. The timeline focuses on the general population of sophisticated users, rather than on the plaintiff’s actual knowledge, and conforms to the defense's purpose to eliminate any duty to warn when the expected user population is generally aware of the risk at issue. (2008 WL 878933, p. 10.)

(d) Plaintiff is sophisticated user. Plaintiff completed a year-long course on HVAC systems at a technical institute. He received additional training and certifications, including an Environmental Protection Agency universal certification allowing those certified to work on and purchase refrigerants for large commercial air conditioning systems. The dangers and risks associated with R-22, the refrigerant used by plaintiff, including decomposition and the release of toxic gases when in contact with heat, were noted on the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for R-22, which was given to plaintiff every time he purchased that refrigerant. In addition, defendant's expert testified that, throughout his 28 years as an HVAC technician, it was widely known among HVAC technicians that R-22, when heated, could decompose into toxic byproducts, including phosgene. From this evidence, it is clear that plaintiff knew or should have known of the dangers of R-22 heat exposure and that he was thus a “sophisticated user.” Plaintiff’s claims that he had read the MSDS for R-22 but did not understand that he should avoid heating R-22 and that he had never heard of phosgene gas were irrelevant under the circumstances. (2008 WL 878933, p. 11.)

Witkin References

On negligence actions involving manufacturers, see 6 Summary (10th), Torts, §1168 et seq.

On manufacturers’ duty to warn, in negligence action, of their products' dangers, see 6 Summary (10th), Torts, §1171 et seq.

On strict products liability, see 6 Summary (10th), Torts, §1428 et seq.

On manufacturers’ duty to warn, in strict products liability action, of their products' dangers, see 6 Summary (10th), Torts, §1467 et seq.