Police Officer May Not Rely on Search Condition Unknown to Officer at Time of Search to Justify Warrantless Search of Juvenile Probationer

In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 C.4th ___, ___ C.R.3d ___, ___ P.2d ___, 2006 WL 3437058, 10 Summary (10th), Parent and Child, Supp., §875 and 4 Cal. Crim. Law (3d), Illegally Obtained Evidence, Supp., §53, overruled In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 C.4th 68, 32 C.R.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519, 10 Summary (10th), Parent and Child, §875, which upheld a warrantless police search of a juvenile probationer based on a probation search condition of which the officer was unaware at the time of the search. A minor, J, and three other people were detained by a police officer who observed what he erroneously believed were traffic violations justifying a traffic stop. While talking to J, who had been driving the vehicle, the officer saw a box of ammunition in plain sight on the front floorboard. After determining that no one in the vehicle had a valid driver’s license, the officer called a tow truck to store the car. A later inventory search of the vehicle revealed a loaded handgun. After J's motion to suppress the firearm was denied because he was on probation and subject to a probation search condition, the juvenile court sustained a delinquency petition, finding that J drove a vehicle without a license, was a gang member, and carried a loaded firearm. Held, the warrantless search of J was invalid where, at the time of the search, the searching officer had neither reasonable suspicion of criminal activity nor knowledge that J was subject to a probation search condition.

(a) Deterrence of police misconduct. People v. Sanders (2003) 31 C.4th 318, 2 C.R.3d 630, 73 P.3d 496, 4 Cal. Crim. Law (3d), Illegally Obtained Evidence, Supp., §50A, a case involving the search of an adult parolee who was subject to a search condition of which police officers were unaware at the time of the search, relied on the rule of In re Martinez (1970) 1 C.3d 641, 83 C.R. 382, 463 P.2d 734, that the reasonableness of a search must be determined based on the circumstances known to the officers at the time of the search. This rule is consistent with the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule: to deter police misconduct. Sanders reasoned that to admit evidence obtained during a search that the officer had no reason to believe was legal would “legitimize unlawful police conduct.” This analysis would seem to apply to searches of juvenile probationers as well. (2006 WL 3437058, p. 3.)

(b) Reduced expectation of privacy. Sanders observed that a parolee’s expectation of privacy, while diminished, is not eliminated, and is “inextricably linked” to whether the search is reasonable. Even a person subject to a search condition retains a reasonable expectation that an officer will not undertake a search justified by neither a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity nor knowledge of the search condition. (2006 WL 3437058, p. 4.) Under Samson v. California (2006) 547 U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250, both parolees and probationers retain some expectation of privacy, and probationers more than parolees, since parole is more akin to imprisonment than is probation. This reasoning undercuts the theory of Tyrell J. that a juvenile probationer subject to a search condition has no expectation of privacy whatever. (2006 WL 3437058, p. 6.)

(c) Deterring future misconduct. The existence of a probation search condition should deter future criminal acts by an adult or a juvenile, and that deterrence would not be compromised by a requirement that the searching officer be aware of that condition. (2006 WL 3437058, p. 4, citing Tyrell J. dissent.)

(d) Special needs. The dissent in Tyrell J. questioned whether the needs of the juvenile probation system could be advanced by a police officer having no notice of a search condition, rather than a probation officer having an ongoing relationship with a juvenile whose welfare the officer seeks to promote. (2006 WL 3437058, p. 4.) And the argument that the Tyrell J. rule would discourage criminal behavior by juvenile probationers who know that they are subject to search at any time was rejected as to adult parolees and probationers in Sanders, which stated that if a police officer was not aware that a suspect was on probation and subject to a search condition, the state's interest in supervising probationers or its concern that probationers are more likely to commit criminal acts does not justify the search. (2006 WL 3437058, p. 7.)

Needs of the juvenile justice system beyond deterring future criminal acts have not been identified. Arguably the need to rehabilitate juvenile offenders is no greater than the need to reduce the recidivism rate among adult parolees. (2006 WL 3437058, p.7.) And the doctrine of parens patriae, positing a special relationship between the juvenile probationer and the state that gives rise to a special need to supervise the juvenile, subject only to the juvenile's right to be free of arbitrary, capricious or harassing searches, cannot be allowed to defeat the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule -- the deterrence of police misconduct. Moreover, a search based neither on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity nor on knowledge of a search condition can properly be characterized as arbitrary. (2006 WL 3437058, p. 8.)

One justice dissented, agreeing that Tyrell J. should be disapproved to the extent that it concludes that a juvenile probationer has no expectation of privacy, but arguing that, rather than a bright-line rule, the totality of the circumstances test should be applied, and that under that test this search should have been upheld. (2006 WL 3437058, p. 9.)

Witkin References

On exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in juvenile delinquency matters, see 10 Summary (10th), Parent and Child, §875.

On requirement of knowledge of search condition to justify warrantless search of adult parolee, see 4 Cal. Crim. Law (3d), Illegally Obtained Evidence, Supp., §50A.

On requirement of knowledge of search condition to justify warrantless search of probationer, see 4 Cal. Crim. Law (3d), Illegally Obtained Evidence, §53.