Plaintiff Who Establishes Violation of ADA Need Not Prove Intentional Discrimination To Obtain Damages Under C.C. 52.

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In Munson v. Del Taco (2009) 46 C.4th 661, 94 C.R.3d 685, 208 P.3d 623, the court answered a question from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: Must a plaintiff seeking damages under C.C. 52, in claiming a denial of full and equal treatment on the basis of a disability in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (C.C. 51) and the Americans With Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C., §12101 et seq.), prove intentional discrimination? Held, no. To the extent Gunther v. Lin (2006) 144 C.A.4th 223, 50 C.R.3d 317, 8 Summary (10th), Constitutional Law, Supp., §914, and Coronado v. Cobblestone Village Community Rentals, L.P. (2008) 163 C.A.4th 831, 77 C.R.3d 883, 8 Summary (10th), Constitutional Law, Supp., §958, hold to the contrary, they are overruled.

(a) In Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 C.3d 1142, 278 C.R. 614, 805 P.2d 873, 8 Summary (10th), Constitutional Law, §912, the court concluded that a plaintiff seeking recovery under the Unruh Civil Rights Act was required to plead and prove intentional discrimination in public accommodations in violation of the Act. However, the 1992 Legislature amended the Act (see C.C. 51(f)) to provide that a violation of the ADA is also a violation of C.C. 51. (46 C.4th 692.) The expressed intent of this change was to strengthen California law where it is weaker than the ADA, and to retain California law where it provides more protections than the ADA, such as a private action for damages. (46 C.4th 690.) C.C. 51(f) does not distinguish between those ADA violations involving intentional discrimination and those resulting from the discriminatory effects of architectural barriers. (46 C.4th 692.)

(b) Gunther distinguished between (1) violations of C.C. 51, and (2) violations of C.C. 51 warranting a remedy under C.C. 52, which, it held, required proof of intentional discrimination. But the more natural reading of C.C. 52 and its legislative history is that C.C. 52 provides remedies for all categories of discrimination prohibited by C.C. 51. C.C. 52 authorizes an action for damages against a person who discriminates contrary to C.C. 51. By adding C.C. 51(f), the Legislature included ADA violations in the category of discrimination covered by C.C.51, thus making them remediable under C.C. 52. (46 C.4th 693.)

(c) This interpretation comports with recent legislative efforts to improve compliance with access laws while protecting businesses from abusive litigation. C.C. 55.56, enacted in 2008, restricts the availability of damages that may be recovered on a construction-related accessibility claim under both C.C. 54.3 (the Disabled Persons Act) and C.C. 52 to a violation that actually denies the plaintiff full and equal access on a particular occasion. In adopting the construction-related accessibility law, the Legislature chose not to require a plaintiff to give prelitigation notice of a violation and an opportunity to cure before seeking liability. (46 C.4th 698.)

Witkin References

On Americans With Disabilities Act generally, see 8 Summary (10th), Constitutional Law, §882 et seq.

On Unruh Civil Rights Act generally, see 8 Summary (10th), Constitutional Law, §898 et seq.

On enforcement of Unruh Civil Rights Act, see 8 Summary (10th), Constitutional Law, §914.

On Disabled Persons Act generally, see 8 Summary (10th), Constitutional Law, §957 et seq.

On Construction-Related Accessibility Standards Compliance Act, see 8 Summary (10th), Constitutional Law, Supp., §§958, 959.